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RECONSTRUCTION .AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
THERE is a general disposition to assume that four years of dread-
ful war have so altered men's minds and characters and the under-
pinnings of organized society, that the world will be quite a different 
place from that which our observations and our studies have made 
familiar. This belief does not altogether carry conviction to my 
mind. The civilized world was threatened with an evil domination 
and combined to defend itself. This instinct and combination for 
defense are as old as the Greek Republics. For a generation to 
come the world will see less movement because of the war's exhaus-
tion; it will have less money to spend and must economize; it will 
have higher taxes and therefore higher costs of production; here 
and there it will experience such change of governmental forms as 
should insure larger self-government. 
But such results of war do not imply a change in human or even 
in national character. Peoples will continue to have that degree 
of control over their own destinies which their own character ex-
presses and demands. The slavish nature will continue to live under 
a despot, whether he be called czar or head of a committee. The 
free spirit will continue to live under free institutions, because by 
self-lmowledge and self-control he deserves them; and the title of 
the executive head of his state, whether king or president, is a matter 
of indifference. For realities and not forms are what count. Read-
justment of existing principles to new conditions may be necessary, 
therefore, while reconstruction in the sense of the evolution of new 
principles and their application to a new world order, is unnec-
essary and unlikely. 
It will be objected here that the French Revolution was a turning-
point in the world's life, and that the present situation is compar-
able to that. I reply that it was not the upheaval in France ~hat 
really counted, but the new philosophy which preceded the Revolu-
tion and brought it on; moreover, that there is nothing of a similar 
nature at the present, except perhaps the German theory of state 
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morality, and that has been discredited. The distinction is between
a political philosophy which succeeded and revolutionized the world,
and a political philosophy which has failed and will disappear.
Let us apply the doctrine that the old order has not fundamentally
changed to the relations of states with one another. National ani-
mosities and jealousies and rivalries will not disappear in the coming
era. Progress does not imply throwing away the fruits of the past.
War will not be done away with, but only be made more difficult.
And the rules of war will not greatly change, but the violation of
those rules will be straightway punished. This is the ideal to work
toward, remembering that the Law of Nations, like other law, in
fact more fully than other law, is a growth and not a creation. If
a weakness appears, we strive to remedy it, we do not seek to replace
the entire fabric.
The principles of international law in time of peace are not so
seriously controverted as to menace the world's progress. By a series
of conventions ratified by the more important states and gradually
covering all the relations of states in time of peace, we may hope
to build up a code of rules, clearer, more comprehensive, perhaps
more just than that body of usage heretofore recognized. Much
progress has already been made in this direction.
It is the rules which govern the relations of states in time of war
which are troublesome. In war there are three separate sets of in-
terests involved, those of the two belligerent parties and of the neu-
tral world.
Each of these three possesses rights and owes duties which are of
very vital importance. Each accordingly will strain every nerve so
to interpret any mooted question as to favor its own interest. Now
in most wars the belligerents and neutrals have to give and take.
There is such balance between them that neither can enforce his own
view without concession. Hence it is accurate to say that the great
body of law relating to war has grown slowly out of century-long
discussions and compromises between belligerent and neutral.
We are just emerging from a war where two features, quite at
variance with this growth process, confront us. For one thing, the
neutral influence has been relatively so weak that it could not main-
HeinOnline  -- 13 Am. J. Int'l L. 188 1919
RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
tain its rights. For another, we have had to deal with a belligerent
who has recognized as binding no rules or obligations which he
deemed disadvantageous to his arms. His breach of the law, on the
admitted principle of retaliation, has led at times to the same breach
by his enemy. From this double attack upon the laws of war as
accepted prior to 1914, chaos has resulted. What we want, there-
fore, is to get back to an earlier and better status and to devise
some expedient for the future, which shall make the violation of its
laws less likely, because more certainly and immediately punished.
My conception, then, of reconstrucfion and international law, is
of the old system of law with new teeth, so that somehow some time
a calculated breach, by individual or by state, will find a penalty.
In order to understand the serious nature and extent of the problem,
at this point I desire to catalogue and to classify the violations of
law and the variations 'from accepted usage which this war has
witnessed.
And first as to war on land. The war began with the unprovoked
invasion of Belgium. There were two approaches to France, one
across a common frontier, the other over neutral territory. The one
was carefully guarded and fortified; the other fairly open to attack.
The one to the south was broken by the Vosges Mountains, was shorter
than the Belgian front and less suited to the wide sweeping advance
of a huge modern army. The route through Belgium, on the other
hand, was level and well supplied with rail and highway communi-
cation. It was preferred by the great German staff on the score of
military convenience. Now to attack a friendly state with which
one has no quarrel, simply because it is convenient to do so, is the
unpardonable sin, the sin against the Holy Ghost. That Germany
was itself one of the guarantors of Belgian neutralization, intensified
a crime, it did not originate it.
The general principles which cover the rights of neutrals are laid
down in one of the Hague Conventions, V, 1907. Articles 1, 2 and
10 read as follows:
Art. 1. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.
Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of
either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral
Power.
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Art. 10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force,
attempts to violate its neutrality can not be regarded as a hostile act.
I
This convention was ratified by Germany, November 27, 1909. It
merely stated with precision a rule which was perfectly well estab-
lished and long operative. There can be, therefore, no shadow of
doubt that Germany's'crossing of Belgium to get at France was a
breach of international law and of treaty. If the resistance of Bel-
gium to invasion can not be regarded as a hostile act, as the article
just quoted declares, then no state of war resulted and the German
army was not entitled to consider Belgium an enemy state, and its
territory occupied, with the rights which occupation gives the in-
vader. This, however, is rather a matter for curious speculation
than of practical importance, for when the whole country was over-
run and local sovereignty crushed, the will of the German occupants
was alone in a position to be enforceable.
Generally speaking, the principle which governs occupation is
that occupied territory is governed by martial law in terms of the
local law, that is, by the will of the commander working through
local officials as far as possible, over country which by the actual
constant presence of invading troops is not under the control of the
legitimate sovereign. The 1907 Convention IV respecting the laws
and customs of war on land, ratfied by Germany, November 27,
1909, recognizes this principle, and even goes beyond it, in declaring
that "the high contracting parties clearly do not intend that unfore-
seen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left
to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders." With this
proviso, the Convention lays down rules which I have space only to
summarize, in the most essential particulars.
The inhabitants of an occupied territory shall be considered
combatants if they carry arms openly and respect the laws of war,
even if they have not had time to organize as militia.
Prisoners of war may be set to work if the work is not excessive
and' does not relate to the operations of war. They shall be clothed
and fed as well as the troops of the captor. All their personal be-
longings remain their property.
HeinOnline  -- 13 Am. J. Int'l L. 190 1919
RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERNATIOAL LAW
It is prohibited to employ poison; to refuse quarter; to employ
means of destruction calculated to cause unnecessary suffering-ex-
plosive bullets, for instance; to make improper use of a flag of truce
or the badges of the Geneva Convention; to destroy enemy's property,
unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; to attack
or bombard by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings, or build-
ings which are undefended; to pillage, even when a place is taken
by assault; to use projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion
of asphyxiating or deleterious gases; to use bullets which expand or
flatten easily in the human body; to force information from the
inhabitants of occupied territory..
I add two significant articles verbatim:
Art. 46. Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must
be respected. Private property can not be confiscated.
Art. 50. No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be
inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals
for which they can not be regarded as jointly and severally respon-
sible.
And finally comes Art. 56:
The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when.
State property, shall be treated as private property.
All seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is
forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.
As to the use of expanding bullets, there is no convincing and
overwhelming evidence of it on the part of either belligerent. Our
own country did not sign that agreement and therefore can not
claim protection under it. Probably soldiers in every army occa-
sionally whittle their cartridge tips and make them soft-nosed.
But barring this prohibition, every other rule which has been
cited, according to a mass of evidence which has been gathered, has
been violated by the German Army apparently with the connivance
or at the order of its high officers. Except in retaliation, there is
no proof of the breach of these rules by the Entente Powers.
And then as to war on the sea.
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The very first act of naval war in the contest was the laying of
floating contact mines in the high seas by the Germans, presently
imitated by the Entente Powers. The Hague Convention VIII, 1907,
thus legislates in this matter:
It is forbidden "to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, ex-
cept when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at
most after the person who laid them ceases to control them;" "to lay
anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as
soon as they have broken loose from their moorings;" "to lay auto-
matic contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the
sole object of intercepting commercial shipping."
Germany signed the Convention, subject to a reservation of this
last provision. But from August 7th she relied largely upon mines
of the two earlier classes to keep the British fleet in check, without
observing the rule as to such construction as made them innocuous
when unwatched or drifting. This was the entering wedge of the
mined area or war zone practice, which grew to great proportions in
the hands of both belligerents in the course of the war. The laying
of mines in the high seas area is not alone a violation of the conven-
tion just cited; it is also an exercise of sovereign control over waters
outside those territorially owned, which violates neutral rights. The
United States Government, the strongest neutral then existing, natu-
rally protested against British as well as German action, not accept-
ing the theory that retaliation in kind at the cost of the neutral could
be justified. This is perhaps the only limitation of "the freedom of
the seas" which this war has shown to be clearly open to criticism.
To make this clear it may be well at this point in the narrative
to group together the other complaints which our government while
neutral pressed against the Entente Powers. They relate to blockade,
to methods of search, to the enlargement of the contraband list, to
extraction of enemy persons from neutral ships on the high seas, and
to a limitation of trade with other neutrals or rationing. When We
became belligerents we shared in applying the last named restriction.
It was a novel and unpleasant though perhaps unavoidable feature
of the war.
Our criticism of the British blockade of German ports was two-
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fold: first, that on account of the submarine menace it was con-
ducted so far from the German coast as to bring its legality in
question; second, that it was not applied to the trade between Sweden
and Germany's Baltic ports and was therefore discriminatory,
whereas the first essential of a legal blockade is that it must affect
all neutrals alike.
As to contraband, there was constant enlargement of the list,
there was constant shifting of commodities from the class of what
is only occasionally or exceptionally contraband to that which is
absolute. Owing to the growth of scientific adjuncts to modern war,
there is scarcely an article or substance which may not have relation to
it. Contraband is not covered by any Hague Convention; moreover,
the Declaration of London, which attempted to lay down the rules
of naval war, was not ratified by Parliament and was, therefore, in
this war not in effect. One must resort to the naval prize codes of
the various states to learn its definition. Thus the German Prize
Code in force in 1915, Arts. 22 and 24, declares that "to the list of
absolute and of conditional contraband must be added such other
articles and materials as have been expressly declared" to belong in
these classes by the German Empire. The British Admiralty went
on the same principle. Though exasperating this enlargement of the
contraband list from time to time is not unfair, because new methods
or substances come into use. Thus, rubber was pIlaced as late as
1909 amongst commodities which could not be called contraband in
the abortive Declaration of London, and by 1914 on truck, ambulance
and airplane wheels it had become of first rate importance in war.
There were a few cases of the removal of German reservists and
other subjects from neutral ships on the high seas, the offense which
in the Trent affair during our Civil War led so nearly to a break
with England. This practice was so clearly illegal, however, that it
was not persisted in and in most cases the captives were surrendered.
The British right to search we did not question, but the delays
incident to this were complained of, often including the landing and
investigation of the entire cargo on mere suspicion. So likewise was
the assumption that much of our trade with Holland and with Sweden
and Norway was really with Germany, on the theory of the con-
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tinuous voyage. To avoid this suspicion, Holland devised a system
by which all imports were billed to a single agency which guaranteed
non-exportation. And yet the home-grown equivalent of the importa-
tion might be exported, and trouble resulted. Switzerland and Hol-
land were dependent very largely upon Germany for coal, and Ger-
many drove a hard bargain, compelling foodstuffs in exchange. Then,
as all supplies the world over grew scarce, the Entente demanded its
share of any exportable food. And, finally, when the United States
entered the war, it supplied the needs of its partners before it fed
the neutral, and had only a meager allowance for the latter, thus
between two millstones.
The various causes of complaint which have been mentioned led
to animated diplomatic interchanges, too long deferred by Mr. Bryan,
but pushed with skill by Mxr. Lansing. They might easily have grown
into a serious situation. For when the British authorities said, if you
think yourselves wronged, appeal to our courts, we replied, "Your
courts are bound by Orders in Council and are not free therefore to
do exact justice. You are governed by military necessity at sea just
as fully as the Germans are on land." Then the air was cleared by
the judgment of the British court in the Zamora case, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court having jurisdic-
tion in Admiralty. This is a matter of such importance as to warrant
a moment's notice, for it showed the real gulf existing between Ger-
man and British standards of justice.
The Zamora was a Swedish vessel loaded with copper which,
under the circumstances, was contraband. But instead of trying the
case and condemning the cargo, the authorities, acting under an
Order in Council, which represents naval necessity, requisitioned it.
Thus there came about a conflict between international law and an
executive order. As to this the court declared repeatedly in no un-
certain voice that international law was paramount.
The idea that the King in Council, or indeed any branch of the
Executive, had power to prescribe or alter the law to be administered
by courts of law in this country was not in harmony with the prin-
ciples of our Constitution.
A prize court must of course deal judicially with all questions
which come before it for determination, and it would be impossible
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for it to act judicially if it were bound to take its orders from one
of the parties to the proceedings.
If the court is to decide judicially in accordance with what it
conceives to be the law of nations, it can not, even in doubtful cases,
take its directions from the Crown, which is a party to the proceed-
ings. It must itself determine what the law is according to the best
of its ability, and its view, with whatever hesitation it be arrived at,
must prevail over any executive order. Only in this way can it
fulfill its function as a prize court, and justify the confidence which
other nations have hitherto placed in its decisions.
It will be noticed that none of the British acts of which our
government complained affected the life or limb of any American
citizen; property alone was involved, owing to what we held to be a
mistaken idea of a belligerent's rights as against neutral trade. Par
otherwise was it with German methods at sea. Except for occasional
forays, her surface fleet was kept behind barriers. Her raiders and
Pacific squadron in time were wiped out. There remained only her
under-water boats to blockade, to search for contraband, to prey upon
enemy's commerce and repress the neutral.
The U-boat is flimsily built, of small stowage capacity, and neces-
sarily handicapped in doing cruiser work. Consequently, it has
claimed a preferential position, enjoying all the rights of a cruiser
without its obligations. This the neutral has denied. If it is used
for blockade, such blockade must be made effective by the continuous
presence of sufficient ships to make access to the ports or coasts
blockaded extremely difficult. This was never the case. The occa-
sional appearance of a submarine, coupled with dire threats of sink-
ing if neutral ships resort to certain specified areas, does not con-
stitute a valid blockade.
So with contraband. Visitation, search, seizure, safe disposal of
the personnel, this orderly sequence of events must precede con-
demnation by a court. In only a few cases before this war have
neutral ships carrying contraband been destroyed.
Destruction of the enemy's merchantmen for want of ports open to
prizes is a harsh but legitimate penalty, always subject, however, to
such disposition of passengers and crew as humanity demands. Other-
wise the act of sinking is murder. That happened in the case of the
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Lusitania. But the German sinking without warning of numberless
neutral ships was infinitely worse. For in such case to murder is
added the illegal destruction of neutral property without that search
which is essential to discover nationality, destination and loading.
When this issue was fairly joined with the United States there
could be but one outcome. A state which permits its subjects to be
murdered and their property destroyed without armed protection,
fails to perform its duty as a state and is no longer entitled to the
allegiance of its citizens. Thus war was inevitable. Whatever ideal-
istic motives may have also had weight, the war was fundamentally
one of self-defense.
This, then, is an outline of the many serious violations of the rules
of war by land and by sea, perpetrated largely by one of the bellig-
erents, which have marked the last four years, and the reconstruction
of international law involves the plain question, how a repetition of
these war crimes can be forever prevented. The answer I think is
twofold, by the prevention of war itself and by the punishment of
the crimes.
Two movements have gone on side by side for as many genera-
tions, for the abolition of war and the humanization of war. They
assume that offenses will come, and then try either to find a workable
substitute for war as a means of settlement, or, if resort must be
had to war, try to minimize its evils by stringent rules laying down
how non-combatants and their property shall be treated, how com-
batants must treat one another and what precisely are the rights and
duties of the outsider, the neutral nations.
The punishment of war crimes is necessary for the humanization
of war, because this latter depends upon laws, and laws must be
enforced under penalty. These crimes are against the person and
against property; the party answerable for them may be a govern-
ment or an individual. When a state is guilty, as for instance our
own country would be if by act of Congress unjust war should be
levied, the only penalty possible is a pecuniary one, an indemnity.
Practically, an indemnity can be levied and collected only as the
result of successful war. And it is difficult to determine the justice
of a war to assess the guilt of a whole country, except on the evi-
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dence of historical investigation. We, therefore, have the illogical,
the painful, fact to face, that only the loser pays an indemnity,
whether he be in the right or in the wrong. The individual can be
held responsible more easily, yet even in his case the tendency will
be to punish losers only. Hence the ideal system must place both
trial and punishment in neutral hands.
There is another way of checking war crimes, namely, by re-
taliation, by treating your enemy as he treats you. This is not by
way of revenge, but is what Professor Lieber calls "protective retri-
bution." One violation of law is punished by the commission of an-
other. Thus the poison gas weapon of the Germans in the recent
war was met by gas more poisonous still. Denial of quarter is pun-
ished by the refusal of quarter in turn. If the war criminal is cap-
tured, of course he bears the penalty in his own person. But if he
is not in his enemy's power, that enemy under the principle of
retaliation may punish any one whom he has captured. This is not
a satisfactory method of penalizing crime, though it is legal and
better than nothing.
I would suggest that war crimes are against the person and against
property; that the penalty might be similarly a pecuniary one or a
personal one; that its nature and degree follow the usage of the
country of the defendant, and that if possible a system be worked
out whereby investigation of alleged crimes may be speedy, and
certain punishment be visited upon conviction. Such a plan is not
a novelty. Certain writers have advocated it, and the Carnegie Com-
mission argues its necessity in that terrible catalogue of war crimes
which it lists in its report on the atrocities of the Balkan Wars. If
no such plan can be made operative, and if in subsequent wars the
same disregard of the rules should be evident as in this war, then
the laws of war are no better than a dead letter. But I look for a
commission to investigate and punish German war crimes, as one
outcome of the Peace Conference.
The other movement, for the substitution of some kind of judicial
procedure for war as a means of settling differences between states,
has been the dream of the ages. A vast literature has grown up
concerning it. Societies exist to further it. And real progress has
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been made through the special arbitration of hundreds of interna-
tional disputes, by courts chosen ad hoc. Few of these disputes,
however, would have resulted in war, even if not thus settled, be-
cause they were relatively unimportant. What is wanted is a sub-
stitute for war, not a mere substitute for diplomacy, which most arbi-
tration is. Nevertheless, there is a judicial quality in arbitration
which is not sufficiently recognized by the advocates of a world court
which shall have jurisdiction over all questions. Thus, the award of
the King of the Netherlands in 1831 in the Northeastern boundary
dispute with Great Britain, was really a suggestion of compromise,
not a decision on facts and questions submitted. It was, therefore,
rejected by both parties to the treaty of submission.
When two states agree to arbitrate a particular dispute, it is the
presumption that they contemplate losing as well as winning the
case, and that they prefer to lose it rather than to use force. But
in all the proposals of a general arbitral system prior to the last
century, except Kant's, whether called Court or Congress or League,
the judgment given was to be executed, if necessary, by force. It is
just in this particular, that the two systems differ radically. And
therefore in studying any new proposal which aims at the replace-
ment of war by some substitute for it, one must always inquire what
are the means of enforcing a verdiet. If they exist, there may result
war to prevent war; but this risk must be run. Fundamentally this
is 'the justification of war, that it is the attempt to execute a judg-
ment though that judgment is self-pronounced. When the judgment
is pronounced by some extra-national court or league, the power to
execute must still be provided. Otherwise the system is a failure,
and the court an object of contempt.
In an orderly, well-policed community, law is enforceable be-
cause the agents of the law are organized and armed. The opponents
of law and order are unorganized and usually forbidden to carry
arms. Must it not be the same if a number of states pool their forces
for the sake of international order; military power must be sur-
rendered by the individual state and concentrated in the hands of
the league. Is it too much to say that the first essential of success,
if a league of states attempts to judge and to police international
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society, is that the military power in its hands shall be relatively
predominant? This means that the members may retain only force
enough for domestic control; that they surrender their great stand-
ing armies and their systems of universal conscription, their fortresses
and their arsenals, so that if a member state does resort to war, its
preparations shall take a year or more. Disarmament, delay in
ability to strike, centralized power, and the consciousness of the
solidarity of the many states in league against the one independent,
these seem to me to be the prerequisites to a workable scheme of
combination against war. Here it may be noted that if a state sur-
renders its system of universal service, the officer class automatically
is forced into civil life, with a consequent change of ideals; more-
over, that the great munition factories beat their swords into plow-
shares; and lastly that war, though not impossible, is certainly made
more difficult. If we would be honest, perhaps this final conclusion
is all that we have a right to expect.
But besides the military power of execution lodged in the hands
of a league, it must have economic pressure at its command also. If
one contemplates an international boycott loyally carried out it is a
tremendous weapon. Ships are refused entrance to all ports; all
traffic is cut off; raw materials are denied; there are neither mails
nor cables nor personal intercourse; as by a stroke, the national body
is paralyzed.
Perhaps too much stress has been laid upon the ability of a league,
aspiring to substitute law for force, nevertheless to have force at its
command. President Wilson, as the apostle of such a league, has
suggested the value of friendship as its foundation. But a political
society is a very peculiar thing. It is compounded of racial and
historical prejudices, of trade rivalries,, of lingual and geographical
limitations, of anything but friendships. Friendship is hardly a
status in itself; it grows rather out of other factors, like trade which
is mutually profitable, like political interests which are identical.
Is it better to preach a gospel of perfection, or to found your system
on things as they are ?
To understand the proposed League Constitution we must begin
with Mr. Wilson's fourteenth point, because the armistice is based
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upon his program and peace is patterned after the armistice: "A
general association of nations must be formed, under specific cove-
nants, for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity in great and small states alike."
And his number four demands, "Adequate guarantees given and
taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point
consistent with domestic safety."
This is disarmament, which is good, coupled with a league for the
preservation of the status quo, which is not so good. The object of a
league was amplified in Mr. Wilson's Fourth of July address, to
"check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice
more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all
must submit and by which every international readjustment, that can
not be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned, shall
be sanctioned." This rather vaguely implies territorial changes in
states, if sanctioned by the league, and removes the reproach that
the war will result in a world stabilized but hidebound.
On September 27, 1918, came further enlightenment: The league
must be part of the peace settlement. It is necessary to guarantee
the peace. It must involve impartial justice; must consult a com-
mon interest; must exclude selfish economic combinations; must also
exclude special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities. Pass-
ing by the futility of this last phrase (for states without economic
rivalry are states that are dead), it is noteworthy that nowhere does
Mr. Wilson's league program call for the settlement of disputes by
any judicial process.
In a similar strain, the day the armistice was signed, Lloyd George
said: "A large number of small nations have been reborn in Europe,
and these will require a League of Nations to protect them against
the covetousness of ambitious and grasping neighbors." But on the
5th of January he had gone beyond this pilrely political conception
of a League, saying,."A great attempt must be made to establish by
some international organization an alternative to war as a means
of settling international disputes."
This was also in Lord Curzon's mind, June 26, 1918: "We must
try to get some alliance or confederation or conference to which these
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states shall belong, no state in which shall be at liberty to go to war
without reference to arbitration, or to a conference of the League,
in the first place."
Lord Robert Cecil goes very much farther, urging that a League
was essential to the relief of starving peoples, to the regulation of
railways, posts and wires. He laid upon it also "public health and
the protection of women and juveniles in industry" and the guidance
of backward peoples.
A year earlier the French Chamber of Deputies resolved that
victory must bring "durable guarantees for peace and independence
for peoples, great and small, in a League of Nations such as has
already been foreshadowed."
And there are many contemporary expressions of approval of the
League principle, but equally vague as to what the details shall be.
The program of Mr. Taft's League to Enforce Peace, however, is
not vague; it is quite specific in advocating the tribunal idea, in back-
ing it with force, so as to insure delay at least, and in promoting
world progress as well as world peace.
These various programs show the extremes of opinion which the
League discussion has brought out. They also convince one that
some kind of a League is really probable. It is now or never. It is
the psychological moment. But is it to be chiefly machinery for the
education and protection of the new states which the peace may
create; or may there be coupled with this a kind of international
uplift movement!
The first is wise, provided it does not copy the Holy Alliance.
That league in 1815, in the name of Christianity, to perpetuate re-
ligion, peace and justice, tried to stabilize European political society
in the interest of absolutism; it even planned to extend its influence
to this continent. This League must not similarly, in the name of
peace and justice, try to stabilize the world in the interest of democ-
racy. It would be an identical blunder. For when, to use the preva-
lent phrase, self-determination of a people has formed a state, that
state is endowed with sovereignty and independence and, like maturer
states, has the right to be let alone. Its future must be determined
by itself, not by others.
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As for the second ideal, a socialized international society of states
built up on a basis of altruism rather than on reciprocal benefits-
it is built upon the sand. A proposal that all war debts on the
victors' side shall be pooled and then redistributed on the basis of
population or national wealth, has been seriously made and is a
valuable commentary on the new gospel. Moreover, it is practical
politics today, to emphasize nationalism as against internationalism.
Nationalism is the consciousness of race and desire of sovereignty;
we see it in its finest expression in Bohemia. Internationalism, on
the other hand, exalts social welfare and class interest above the
race and the state. That way lies Bolshevism. The one is antidote to
the other.
At the other extreme is a League which shall offer a reasonable
way of keeping the peace between states by providing a tribunal for
judging their differences, with fair assurance that the award can be
executed; by setting up a system of conciliation in disputes which
are not justiciable; by a self-denying renunciation of war between
the members; by making delay certain and settlement probable after
an issue is joined. But it does not absorb the sovereignty of in-
dividual states; they retain their sovereignty. It does not attempt
to govern the world, but to make the world more peaceable.
Of these two ideals, my own judgment, or perhaps it is prejudice,
inclines to the less ambitious program just indicated. It places re-
sponsibility for conduct where it belongs, within the state, and not
in a league outside it. Its working would be easier, its breakdown less
dangerous. But perhaps the outcome may be somewhere between
the two extremes, stressing for the moment the need of enforcing
the terms of peace and of giving a fair start to the backward peoples
which have just achieved statehood.
And here it may not be amiss to place together the desirable
features of a rational International Leagne,1 in accord with the prin-
ciples above advanced, but somewhat more specifically.
Its members retain their sovereignty, each one, but by treaty
for an experimental period, confer certain powers upon a central
body.
These powers are partly administrative. partly judicial, but not
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legislative. Legislation should require further treaty cooperation in
each new proposal.
The administrative powers are to be used, first, to protect newly
formed states; second, to enforce other conclusions of the Peace
Treaties, such as disarmament; third, to carry out decisions of the
League.
Its judicial powers are to conciliate or judge disputes between
members and more widely to substitute law for force in international
relations, so far as possible.
Disarmament must reduce the strength of the individual mem-
bers and thereby relatively increase the strength of the central body,
i.e., the sum of the military units put at its disposal.
The League must also have the power of boycotting as one of its
weapons, but otherwise is not an economic union.
Its field is political; it relegates social problems to the member
states. For instance, women's and children's labor in Japan or
Brazil, seamen's wages in India and the United States, can not be
regulated from a League capital without disaster.
It is a loose union for the prevention of war; with no ulterior
aims beyond this; a limited but a safe conception.
This was written before the first draft of the League Constitu-
tion was given out at Paris, and even yet the last word has not been
said. Judging it in the light of the principles tentatively set forth
above, it would seem to have avoided much that would be dangerous
and to embody much that is hopeful and valuable. Its members
retain their sovereignty. Much stress is laid upon disarmament and
the control of private munition factories. Defense against external
aggression is contemplated, but the right of a state to change its
own condition is not questioned. As between members of the League,
disputes are to be submitted either to arbitration or to inquiry by the
Executive Council before resort to war; this implies a certain delay.
Such submission to arbitration is voluntary, however, while the re-
sort to inquiry at the hands of the Council is obligatory, an inter-
national league boycott being the penalty for non-compliance. The
Council may also use force. These provisions are obscure and need
rephrasing.
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If the dispute is between a League member and an outside state,
such state is forthwith to be asked to join the League for the purpose
of settling the difference, but whether it does so or refuses, the
Executive Council may use its judgment in trying to keep the peace,
acting in accordance with League principles. This is vague and
unsatisfactory.
Then there is a novelty in placing German colonies and backward
states under the protection of advanced powers which are called
Mandatories. The only provision for social welfare is in Article
XX. "The high contracting parties will endeavor to secure and main-
tain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and chil-
dren, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their
commercial and industrial relations extend; and to that end agree
to establish as part of the organization of the League a permanent
bureau of labor." This does not call for uniformity of conditions,
and is probably both meaningless and harmless.
Of course, it is too early to criticize textually. Nor has reference
been made to other subjects treated in the Constitution, but which
are not germane to the special purpose of this paper. In general, it
seems to the writer that the effectiveness of the League machinery
for checking war depends upon the impression of. solidarity which
the League produces, and that this solidarity will depend too
largely upon the make-up of the Executive Council. But read in
connection with the disarmament stipulations, the judicial provisions
should be reasonably, perhaps absolutely, workable.
These, then, are the two principal changes which international
law should find impressed upon its system as a result of the great
war, a league of states which retain their sovereignty but agree to get
the judgment of the whole body in some way before resorting to war;
a method of investigation and punishment which would make the
violation of the laws of war highly dangerous.
There are now two or three other particulars in which the old
law of nations may have new light cast upon it as a result, or by-
product, of the war. If a tribunal, under whatever auspices it comes
into being, adjudges international causes, it will need a code of law,
and it will also tend to build one up. The code with which it will
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set out is one of usage supplemented by treaty compact. It may
lack precision, but is workable nevertheless. In time the demand for
a Code of International Law will create one, not as a whole, but in
parts-diplomatic intercourse, for instance, or maritime jurisdiction,
or the laws of war on sea. Meanwhile, the court itself by dint of
judicial decisions will add to and clarify the law which it administers.
This double process of growth is a better, more reasonable, form of
code-building than codification covering the whole field and jeopardiz-
ing its results by attacking in one engagement all the burning ques-
tions. This method of growth through the arbitral decisions of the
last half century, has already been marked. Thus jurisdiction over
seals' swimming free in the high seas has been denied to the country
of their origin. The Alabama arbitration enlarged heutral duty and
defined due diligence in its performance. Light was thrown upon
the question of how territorial waters shall be measured, in the
Alaska and Newfoundland cases. It is not necessary to multiply
examples.
Another question which the events of the war have brought into
prominence and which the future law might possibly take cognizance
of, relates to armed intervention in the affairs of a state with which
one is not at war, on the plea of self-defense. The condition of por-
tions of Russia illustrates what is meant. The forces of anarchy, of
chaos, have gained the upper hand. Life and property of native and
of alien are in jeopardy. The obligations of the old state are disre-
garded. Moreover, the spirit of misrule, like a religion, is being
spread as widely as possible over the world. Our own country,
Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, are objects of attack, besides contiguous
states. Shall resistance to these noxious doctrines be defensive only,
or may they be attacked at their source? We justify the presence
of our troops in Russia at this moment on the ground of self-defense,
as an outcome of war. But if no declared war existed, and organized
society found itself attacked out of a clear sky, under the new dis-
pensation, what is society to do? Here is war no less real and dread-
ful because unregularized. If a league of states exists to keep the
peace, with powers to settle disputes and to police the world granted
to it, the anarchical menace, if anything, should call those powers out.
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Yet, on the other hand, if we incorporate into the new League the
right of intervention in the affairs of individual states for any pur-
pose whatsoever, we run a serious risk; we play the r6le of the
Concert of Europe; we weaken the educative power of responsibility.
To frame a formula for the conduet of a League of Nations, which
shall be broad enough to crush anarchy anywhere, yet restricted
enougl to guarantee to each state sovereignty and independence, will
require high statesmanship.
I have spoken of the educative power of state responsibility. In
theory this should be a result of independence. But on our own
hemisphere we see too many examples of the failure of the rule.
Through the Monroe Doctrine we have shielded our neighbor repub-
lics from foreign intervention, doing it for our own sake and often
resented by them. We mean well by them. Certain of their quali-
ties we admire. But excepting half a dozen of the better developed,
the Latin American states, from their want of order and of educa-
tion and of self-control, are a menace to our world. Shall they and
their problems, like Bolshevism, come before the League for treat-
ment? Or shall an American league be set up for local treatment,
to assume both responsibility and control? Or more probably still,
shall this old world and this new one muddle along very much as
they have since the beginnings of history, gaining here a little and
there a little, the law of their relations changing with the law of
.their progress, the moral uses of dark things revealed, to those who
can see, by Divine Providence.
'When a criminal breaks thelaw and at last is caught and punished,
we do not say that the law has broken down; we say rather that it
has been enforced, that the law works. So is it with the law which
governs the relations of states. It has been cruelly violated. There
were times when the criminal seemed immune. But his punishment
has begun. Every restitution, every penalty, every act of atonement,
is proof that the law he scorned is stronger than he. Its grasp is
firmer, its future is brighter than before, and its field is greater.
Like the last runner in a relay we have reached the line, and the
line is justice.
THEODORE S. WOOLSEY.
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